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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This case involves a claim by appellant for payment of
group health and accident benefits and life insurance denied to
appellant by his employer Wycoff Company and Lafayette Life
Insurance Company.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The District Court granted summary judgments in favor
of respondents dismissing appellant's complaint.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondents seeks affirmation of the summary judgments.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Wycoff Company employed Stanley L. Larson from approximately March 20, 1977 until May, 1979.

Mr. Larson commenced

working for Wycoff on a part-time basis on the dock.

In May,

1977, he transferred from part-time to full-time employment and
remained full-time until September, 1978, when he transferred to
the diesel shop as a part-time employee.

Mr. Larson desired to

return to school and the part-time employment was made at his
discretion.
Wycoff provides for its full-time employees two
insurance programs.

One is a health and accident insurance,

which is self-funded by Wycoff, and the other is a life
insurance program, which is covered by a group policy issued by
Lafayette Life Insurance Company.

Galbraith & Green, Inc., a

Utah corporation, is the administrator of the health and accident program for Wycoff, and upon receipt of monthly computer
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lists of eligible employees from Wycoff, forwards the same to
Lafayette Life Insurance Company for its records.
At the time Mr. Larson became a full-time employee, he
was provided with a "red book" which Wycoff provides to all of
its full-time employees and in which, among other things, are
described the benefits available to employees and defines those
who are eligible.

After being a full-time employee for thirty

days, Mr. Larson completed the necessary application forms in
order for he and his dependents to be insured under the health
and accident and group life insurance policies offered in the
"red book" as employee benefits.

Mr. Larson admits that, prior

to the time he transferred to the diesel shop, he was putting in
40 hours a week.

After he transferred to the diesel shop, he

was putting in 25 to 30 hours a week.

Mr. Larson had read the

"red book," not once but on a number of occasions, and there is
no doubt that he understood the language contained therein
regarding the employee benefits and the eligibility requirements, together with all of the other various rules and
regulations of the employer.
It is Mr. Larson's claim that when he transferred from
full-time to part-time employment, he received oral assurances
from at least one supervisor that he would remain covered under
the "benefits" offered by Wycoff.

Subsequent to his becoming a

part-time employee, Wycoff, through its administrator, Galbraith
& Green, Inc., paid Mr. Larson some medical expenses for his

minor son which, under the program, would not have been payable
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because of his becoming an ineligible employee when becoming
part-time.

Wycoff Company has chosen not to seek reimbursement

of those funds from Mr Larson, although it is Wycoff's position
that it could do so.
The medical expenses which are the subject matter of
this action, were incurred primarily for treatment of appellant's 20-month old son, Joshua, who had incurred an illness
which resulted in his death on January 7, 1979.

Under the group

life policy, appellant, if eligible, would be entitled to
$2,000.00 in dependent life insurance proceeds.
This action has been brought by Mr. Larson to recover
the medical expenses incurred after he was no longer covered by
reason of becoming a part-time employee, and to recover the
group life insurance benefits under the policy with Lafayette
Life Insurance Company.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
PLAINTIFF KNEW OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT HE BE A
FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE IN ORDER TO RECEIVE THE HEALTH
AND ACCIDENT BENEFITS.
In the plaintiff's deposition taken September 16, 1979,
by the undersigned, the following questions and answers appear
on pages 11 and 12 regarding the delivery to him of the "red
book" and his examination thereof:
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May of '77 you were delivered what they
called a red book?

Q.

A.

Yes.

Now, that redbook had within it a description
of the health and life insurance program--

Q.

A.

Yes.

Q.

--is that correct?

A.

Yes.

And it had within it information about when
you were eligible and when you weren't eligible;
is that correct?

Q.

A.

Yes, it did.

Did it have in there a page that told you
that full-time employees were eligible?

Q.

A.

Yes.

Let me show you a copy of a page out of the
document--at least, I believe it to be--and ask
you if you recognize that as being page 1 under
"Definitions" (handing).

Q.

(Witness examines.)
A.

This appears to be that same page.

Mr. Moffat:

Let's mark that.

(Wycoff Exhibit A was marked for identification.)
You will note that the Exhibit was marked as Exhibit A
to the Larson deposition and sets forth, inter alia, the eligibility requirements for participation in the insurance program.
One of those requirements is that the employee be full-time for
thirty days before becoming eligible.

Later, in that same depo-

sition, at pages 18 and 19, Mr. Larson was asked the following
questions and responded as set forth:
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Let me show you a copy of page of--I believe
it came out of the red book--and ask you if you
recognize that (handing).

Q.

(Witness examines.)
A. Okay. This looks like to be the same one
that's in that book.
(Wycoff Exhibit B was marked for identification.)
And it's correct, is it not, Mr. Larson, that
that document in the first paragraph reads:

Q.

"Employees: All active full-time employees
may be included in the company's group
benefit plan the first of the month following completion of 30 days of service,
provided they complete an enrollment card,
as required by the personnel office, and
they are working as full-time employees 40
hours or more per week."
A.

That's what it says.

Q. And you think that's the same as was in the
red book you had?

A.

I

think it's the same.

That document is attached as Exhibit
deposition.

B

to the Larson

On pages 20 and 21, Mr. Larson was asked the

following questions, to which he responded as follows:
Mr. Larson, while we've been off the record your
counsel has furnished us with copies of pages 33
and 36 of what you have identified as being in
the red book. Do you recognize those pages as
having been in your red book?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you read through the red book?

A.

Yes.

Q.

On more than one occasion?
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A.

I looked through it from time to time.

And you're familiar with the provision on the
top of page 36 that reads--I'll let you look at
it while I read it from my copy. This is the
third paragraph.

Q.

"All regular, full-time employees who have
worked for the company for a period of not
less than 30 days are eligible to apply for
the group insurance grogram." You were
familiar with that provision?
A.

Yes.

In fact, you had applied, had you not, to
become eligible when you went full-time?

Q.

A. Well, I would have, but I was helped a great
deal by the supervisor, Mel.
Q. I understand that. But you did have to sign
a card of some kind in order to become qualified?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you recall doing that?

A.

I believe I did.

It is perfectly apparent from reading the foregoing
excerpts from the Larson deposition that Mr. Larson not only
knew of the privilege of enrolling in the insurance programs
after becoming a full-time employee for 30 days, but, further,
that in fact he did enroll and fill out the necessary application forms and submit them to the company in order to obtain
coverage.
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POINT II
IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH ALL OF THE ABOVE-CITED
PORTIONS OF HIS DEPOSITION, THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS
TO HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT HE COULD CONTINUE WITH HIS
EMPLOYEE INSURANCE BENEFITS.
In spite of all of the language quoted from plaintiff'
own deposition, as set forth above, he, nevertheless, claims
that two supervisors advised him that he could continue with hi
benefits if he transferred to the diesel shop, even though he
was going part-time.

The following language commences on page

13 of the plaintiff's deposition.

This is a conversation

alleged by the plaintiff between himself and an individual name<
Floyd Rowley, who is a supervisor over the line driver portion
of Wycoff Company:
Q.

When did you have a discussion with him?

A. When I--I had talked to him sometime previous
about transferring to the diesel shop; and he
hemhawed around and said, "We'll get to it, we'll
get to it." And it finally got down to where the
other supervisor, this Jay Williams, out in the
shop, was putting it to me? "Either you get this
transfer through or something, or we'll have to
find somebody else." We need an employee out
here for the shop. So let's get it done."
So I went to Floyd, and I said, "If you don't get
this transfer in, I'll have to quit." I talked
to Jay about it. "I'll quit Wycoff, the driver
part of it, and start working for Wycoff in the
diesel shop."
Now, Floyd told me that that was a dumb thing to
do, because if I did I would lose all of my
benefits and that I should wait and be transferred out there so that I could retain my
benefits.
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Did he define what benefits·he was talking
about?

Q.

A. I understood that it would be all benefits.
he didn't limit it and say, "You'll get this, and
you'll get that."
Q.

He just said "benefits"?

A.

He said "all benefits."

Did he at that time know that you were going
out there on less than a 40-hour work week?

Q.

A.

As far as

Q.

Had you discussed it with him?

I

know, he did.

A. I had discussed it with him and Jeff that the
reason--one of the reasons that I was moving out
there is because I would be going back to school.
Another conversation allegedly had between Floyd Rowley
and the plaintiff, or Jay Williams and the plaintiff, commencing
on page 15 in his deposition is as follows:
And that was when you had the conversations
you described with Floyd Rowley about you should
transfer to retain your benefits?

Q.

A.

Right.

Did you have any conversations with him or
anybody else specifically about your insurance?

Q.

A. Well, I told Jay what Floyd had said, and he
said he didn't know about it, but he'd check on
it.
Q.

Who is Jay?

A.

Jay Williams.

Q.

When did you tell him that?

A.

Oh, on or about the same day.

Q.

Is that the day you transferred or--

He's the shop foreman.
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A.

No, it was a couple of days before.

Q.

Now, what did you tell him specifically?

A.

Jay?

Q.

Yes.

A.

I told him what Floyd had told me.

Q.

And that was--

A. That I should wait in order to--and be
transferred rather than quitting, so that I could
retain all my benefits.
What did Jay say to you in that regard, if
anything?

Q.

A. He says, "well, if it's going to mean the
difference between your having your benefits or
not, maybe you'd better wait a couple of days and
be transferred.
You said he indicated he was going to check
on something for you?

Q.

A.

Right.

Q.

What was he going to check on?

A. When we was discussing about the benefits and
things a little bit after that, he said he didn't
know about it, but he'd check on it about the
benefits and things.
Did he ever have another conversation with
you about benefits or about insurance?

Q.

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever ask him?

A.

No,

I

don't believe

I

did.

During this whole period of time you've had
in your possession a copy of the red book?

Q.
A.

Uh huh.
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In reviewing the plaintiff's deposition, it becomes
clear that the highest level of authority that anybody could
rise to who spoke to him would either be the supervisor over the
line drivers, who was Floyd Rowley, or a supervisor out in the
shop named Jay Williams.

The one was rather confused about what

he told him and he talked about benefits in general, there being
included within the "red book" numerous benefits in general, not
just those relating to insurance.

The other supervisor, that

being Jay Williams, told him that he would, in effect, check the
matter out and get back to him, which he (Williams) did not do.
Thereafter, the plaintiff never checked again with anybody about
benefits or about insurance.

During the whole of that period of

time, he had in his possession a copy of the "red book," describing the benefits, and he admitted that he had read it on
more than one occasion and was familiar with those requirements.
It might be further noted that these two supervisors
could not bind the corporation under any circumstance.

First,

these were not officers or agents of the corporation.

Second,

they had no authority to bind the corporation in any way whatsoever.

In Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation, Volume 2, Chapter

11, Section 733, it is stated as follows:
Declarations or admissions of an officer or agent
of a corporation are not binding upon it, nor
admissible in evidence against it for any purpose, unless they were made by the officer or
agent in the course of a transaction on behalf of
the corporation, and within the scope of his
authority, or unless they were expressly authorized by the corporation, or have since been
ratified by it.
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There is no claim that anyone Mr. Larson spoke with
rises to the authority of an officer or agent, nor is there any
indication or claim that the people with whom Mr. Larson spoke
had authority to bind the corporation in relation to the
coverage of benefits.
As found in 19 Am. Jur.2d, Corporations, Section 1174,
page 600:
Owing to the enormous scope of the business of
the present-day corporations, their business is
frequently divided into departments, and managers
or superintendents of the departments are
appointed. The manager or superintendent of a
department stands in the same relation to his
department as does the general manager or
superintendent to the general affairs of the
corporation, and the corporation is liable for
his accounts within the apparent scope of his
authority.
Neither of the people that Mr. Larson spoke to stood ir
the position of running the insurance department or of the other
employee benefit areas.

As a matter of fact, as noted in the

quote from Mr. Larson's deposition, as found on page 15, at
lines 11 through 14, Jay Williams agreed to check out what Mr.
Rowley said to the plaintiff about his ability to continue with
his benefits.

But, as also noted, he never responded to the

plaintiff and the plaintiff did nothing further to check upon
the matter.

Under these circumstances, it is apparent that the

two supervisors had no authority to bind Wycoff Company or
Galbraith & Green, Inc.
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POINT III
THE FACT THAT PAYMENTS WERE MADE BY MISTAKE WHEN
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR RECEIVING
BENEFITS DOES NOT BIND WYCOFF COMPANY TO ANY
FURTHER PAYMENTS.
Wycoff paid, through a mistake by its administrator,
Galbraith & Green, Inc., approximately $1,200.00 in medical
bills, which it was not obligated to pay after the plaintiff
became a noneligible employee.

As noted above, Wycoff Company

elects not to sue to recover these amounts, but it could.

As is

said in Volume 18, Couch on Insurance 2d, Section 74:189, "Right
of Insurer to Recover Payments":
As a general rule, if the insurer pays a loss,
being induced so to do by fraud, or by mistake as
to facts which, if it had had knowledge thereof,
would have been a sufficient defense in an action
by the insured upon the policy, the money so paid
may be recovered.
(Citing numerous cases.}
Under the circumstances contained herein, where the
plaintiff was a nonelgible employee, there is no doubt about the
fact that payment was made under a mistake of fact.

If the

insurer, in this case Wycoff Company through Galbraith & Green,
Inc., could recover payments made by mistake, a fortiori, it
could refuse to make any further payments to a noneligible
employee.

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT IV
WYCOFF COMPANY IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM MADE
UNDER THE LAFAYETTE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY POLICY.
The policy of insurace sued upon by the plaintiff runs
from Lafayette Life Insurance Company to the plaintiff.

While

Wycoff Company paid the premium, it had no other connection witl
the policy, other than being the employer of the group that was
insured and obligated to make the premium payment for each of
the qualified employees, which it did.
Appellant's argument that the statutory provisions of
31-20-11, U.C.A.

(Supp. 1979) relating to conversion privilege

is not appropriate for two reasons.

First, the health and

accident coverage (a self insured program) administered by
Galbraith & Green, Inc., is not convertible upon termination.
Second, the statutory law is not retroactive and there is no
common law which would give appellant the relief he seeks.

CONCLUSION

It is clear from the deposition of the plaintiff
himself that he became a noneligible employee and, thus, no
longer was entitled to coverage under either the health and
accident or the life insurance policies.

The plaintiff

admittedly knew of the requirement that he be a full-time
employee, as he first worked for Wycoff Company as a part-time
employee and was not then eligible for the benefits, a fact
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which he admitted.

Later, he became a full-time employee,

applied for and received employee benefits, and had full
knowledge of the requirements, as set forth in the "red book."
The plaintiff has been paid all of the benefits to which he was
entitled and, in fact, has been overpaid.

Under the circum-

stances, summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiff must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BRO

& DUNN

Jamy;·/ • Br
Att r eys for Defendant, Galbraith
& Green, Inc.
MOFFAT, WELLING & PAULSEN
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Attorneys for Def en
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